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Abstract 
 
Research on attachment is widely regarded in sociology and feminist scholarship 
as politically conservative – oriented by a concern to police families, pathologise 
mothers and emphasise psychological at the expense of socio-economic factors. 
These critiques have presented attachment theory as constructing biological 
imperatives to naturalise contingent, social demands. We propose that a more 
effective critique of the politically conservative uses of attachment theory is 
offered by engaging with the ‘attachment system’ at the level of ontology. In 
developing this argument we draw on Deleuze and Guattari, making use of the 
common language of ethology which links their ideas to that of attachment 
theory. The attachment system can and has been reified into an image of the 
infant returning to their caregiver as an image of familial sufficiency. This has 
offered ammunition for discourses and institutions which isolate women from 
health, social and political resources. Yet Deleuze and Guattari can help 
attachment theory and research be recognised as a powerful ally both for 
progressive politics, for reflection on the movement of human individuation, and 
for arguing for the meaningful resourcing of those who care for someone else.  
 
Introduction 
 
Attachment can be considered ‘perhaps the most important developmental 
construct ever investigated’ (Sroufe et al. 2005: 51). Not only has it formed the 
basis for an international research programme, but attachment theory has 
become an influential perspective on child development and on clinical and 
welfare practice, and attachment assessments have seen use in these contexts 
(Kozlowska & Elliott 2014; Teti & Kim 2014). Attachment has been described as 
‘the most popular theory for explaining parent–child behaviour by professionals 
and clinicians’ (Barth et al. 2005: 257), and as ‘one of the key concepts in 
intervention programmes for deprived, neglected and/or maltreated children’ 
(van Rosmalen et al. 2014: 24). Beyond social welfare and clinical practice, 
attachment theory has also influenced other areas of work with children 
including education (e.g. Geddes 2005; Cozolino 2013) and parenting training 
(e.g. Park 2012). It has been among the most significant discourses in shaping 
perceptions of child development and parenting across and beyond Anglophone 
countries. Yet attachment is widely criticised as the textbook case of a politically 
conservative research programme, smuggling social norms under the cover of 
claims to scientific objectivity. Sociologists and feminist scholars have described 
attachment research as a pretext deployed by clinicians and social care 
professionals for constructing mothers as solely responsible for infants and then 
for policing this caregiving. In a study by Hill et al. (1992) of 100 cases of children 
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approved for removal from their families, the attachment behaviour of the child 
and its perceived implications for their later mental health was cited in every 
case as part of the rationale. Critiques of attachment theory have also entered 
public discourse. For example, Hewitt (2013), writing in The Guardian, states that 
‘parenting manuals based on Bowlby's attachment theory prioritise the bond 
between mother and child, sideline the father and keep women away from work.’  
This article begins by introducing attachment theory as a research 
paradigm. We then consider the widespread criticism among sociologists and 
feminist scholars that attachment theory is inherently conservative, and that it 
constructs biological imperatives to naturalise contingent, social demands. We 
agree with such critical commentators that there are often serious problems in 
how attachment theory has sometimes been deployed. We intend to advance 
these concerns by specifying more precisely the location and significance of any 
conservative tendency in attachment theory. Our approach is aligned with 
sociological scholarship which attempt to move beyond social constructionism 
by considering processes and forces conventionally articulated as ‘biological’ and 
‘social’ to be mutually constitutive rather than ontologically distinct (see Davis 
2009 for a review). For instance, scholars have considered topics ranging from 
patients with medically unexplained symptoms (Greco 2012) to jewellery 
designers salivating over gemstones (Hughes 2011). Yet Gallacher and Kehily 
(2013) have observed that sociological work outside of a constructionist 
paradigm on topics relating to developmental psychology has been constrained 
by the dominance of the ‘new sociology of childhood’. This paradigm rules 
attention to biological processes as illegitimate, necessarily mechanistic, and 
politically retrograde. After centuries in which the image of ‘the natural’ has been 
used to circumscribe the possible structures of society, and particularly the 
position of women in relation to children, there is legitimate scepticism 
regarding  forms of inquiry which seek to examine the co-production and 
coupling of biological, social and political assemblages; yet this should not close 
them off. 
In particular, our article responds to calls by sociologists since White 
(1996) and Rustin (1996) – including Lash (2012) in this journal – for a 
framework which can encompass the observations of attachment research. 
Roberts (2013), for example, particularly highlights the importance of research 
which has found associations between attachment patterns in infancy and early 
menarche in girls. She alleges that we cede important and highly political ground 
if attachment theory and research is situated as no more than ideology or merely 
the product of socio-economic factors, without recognising an irreducible role for 
the enmeshment of culture and economics with biology. The urgency of renewed 
attention to the ontology of attachment has been intensified by recent 
developments in bringing together attachment and neuroscientific research (e.g. 
Shore & Shore 2008). As we have explored elsewhere (Duschinsky et al. 2015), 
the claim to neuroscientific objectivity has intensified uses of attachment 
research as a tool for policy discourse on social security and the true nature of 
citizens. 
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 In reconsidering the ontological stakes of attachment theory, we draw on 
Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, whose ethological reflections both align with 
many of the core assumptions of attachment theory, and allow us to present 
these in a new light. Using Deleuze and Guattari for such work may seem strange 
to those who associate these theorists with a universal hostility to developmental 
psychology; yet Deleuze and Guattari ([1971] 1984: 51) specifically affirm the 
significance of attachment phenomena, and urge that ‘it is not a question of 
denying the vital importance of parents or the love attachment of children to 
their mothers and fathers. It is a question of knowing what the place and the 
function of parents are within desiring-production’. In contrast to most 
sociological and feminist critiques of attachment theory, Deleuze and Guattari 
accept attachment as a vital process. However, they demand attention to the 
ways in which child-parent relationships plug into, affect and are affected by 
other processes at different levels. In their perspective, biological, social and 
political assemblages operate below and beyond the level of the human subject. 
These assemblages constitute the regularities described, and by degrees reified, 
by the classification system for coding infant-caregiver behaviour in the 
Ainsworth Strange Situation Procedure, known as the “gold standard” 
attachment measurement. Beneath these classifications, this article will show the 
operation, modulation and conflict of lines of flight. Such an account leads to a 
surprising and far-reaching conclusion: it is attachment phenomena themselves, 
not merely or necessarily attachment theorists, which lend support for 
conservative political and gender discourses. We argue that the demands for 
centripetal reunion enjoined by the attachment system frame an image of 
‘familial sufficiency disrupted and then regained’. These demands align with and 
can be deployed as powerful ammunition for discourses and institutions which 
isolate women from health, social or political resources required for sufficiency. 
Genealogical research on attachment theory (Miller & Rose 1988; Vicedo 
2011) has traced the role of popularisers of Bowlby’s ideas in spreading 
attachment theory to the ‘psy-disciplines’ – the apparatuses of psychological 
surveillance and normalisation in contemporary society. To this research, we 
wish to add an account of the potential politics of the assemblage of biological 
and social components that comprise the attachment system itself – though in 
recognition that attachment phenomena are realised differently across contexts, 
and in turn shape these contexts by the way they are accelerated, inhibited or 
reoriented. Not only, then, would attachment represent a significant 
developmental construct, but our perspective situates it as a definitive case for 
showing the need to reassess constructionist approaches to the political 
formation of human beings. We further contend that coalitions between 
conservative discourses and the attachment system can best be subject to 
critique and broken if we scrutinise rather than dismiss the operation of the 
attachment system, as partly a product of its discursive construction but 
irreducible to this process. Such scrutiny helps discern the difference between 
the demands of the attachment system and the health, social and political 
resources required by a child-caregiver dyad.  
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“Profoundly conservative” 
 
Drawing on both his training as a psychoanalyst of the Object Relations school, 
and contemporary advances in ethological research, the idea of ‘attachment’ and 
the ‘attachment system’ were introduced by John Bowlby. He described the 
operation of a disposition in primate infants which directs them to seek 
proximity to an adult attachment figure when experiencing alarm or separation. 
Proximity is sought through signals and movements including crying, smiling and 
crawling. Such behaviour, Bowlby proposed, anticipates a response by this figure 
which will remove the infant’s experience of potential threat or discomfort. In 
Bowlby’s account, human infants are born with a capacity, under typical 
conditions, to develop this disposition to seek the availability of a familiar 
caregiver when experiencing alarm or separation. However the emergence and 
form taken by this disposition is a composite of neurological, endocrinal, physical 
and social factors: Bowlby describes the attachment system as a machine 
dependent for its emergence upon and only effective through the feedback 
provided by the contingencies of the experience of caregiving. These 
contingencies in the caregiving environment integrate the different components. 
Where this particular form of integration does not or only partially occurs, as for 
instance most starkly in institutionally-raised children where no familiar 
caregiver is available, attachment will not operate as a distinct, integrated 
behavioural system. Furthermore, reflecting on the contingency of the 
attachment system and its form, Bowlby (1969: 240-1) hypothesized that the 
attachment system is inherently incomplete as a system – and this is what makes 
it work. To operate as a system, attachment behaviour presumes upon a 
complementary response in the action of a ‘caregiver behaviour system’ which 
primes the attachment figure to retrieve the distressed infant. The mesh between 
attachment and caregiver retrieval systems thus functions to keep an attachment 
figure near and attentive to the child’s needs: ‘it is fortunate for their survival 
that babies are so designed by Nature that they beguile and enslave mothers’ 
(Bowlby 1958a: 167). He reported that human infants often have their mother as 
their primary attachment figure, and he emphasised the significance of the 
mother’s emotional attitude and sensitivity towards her child as integral for 
development; by contrast ‘little will be said of the father–child relation; his value 
as the economic and emotional support of the mother will be assumed’ (Bowlby 
1953: 13). 
A colleague of Bowlby’s, Mary Ainsworth, formulated a laboratory-based 
observational measure for assessing individual differences in infant attachment: 
the Strange Situation Procedure. In formulating this observational measure, 
Ainsworth was interested in the potential in the life of all infants for anxiety 
regarding the availability of their familiar caregiver. She had previously studied 
this potential in the context of other facets of the child’s life in ethnographic 
research in Ghana and in home observations of Baltimore families. The Strange 
Situation Procedure was designed to refine and structure the environment so 
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that potential anxiety regarding the availability of the familiar caregiver could 
come to the fore for observation, in a functional equivalent of instances of 
separation and reunion embedded in the wider life of the child (see Massumi 
1996; Brown 2012). It made use of the cues of novelty and separation, which 
ethological research had suggested to Ainsworth would activate separation 
distress and attempts to reinstate proximity to the attachment figure. As such, 
the procedure aimed to mobilise the infant's visceral expectations based on what 
happened when anxiety has occurred in the past about the availability of the 
attachment figure, and allow a viewer to interpret these expectations from 
observed behaviour. As the episodes of the procedure incrementally increase the 
infant’s anxiety, Ainsworth asked the observer to consider individual differences 
in the infant's movement between behavioural systems: the interplay of 
exploration of novelty and attachment behaviour, in the presence and in the 
absence of a parent (Ainsworth & Bell 1970). Though this has been too little 
discussed in print by attachment researchers, it is important to note that the 
infant's response to separation and reunion is not reducible to this set of 
expectations; for example, it is likely influenced by the caregiver's facial 
expression on re-entry, and how frequent infant-caregiver separations are within 
a culture and what they mean to the adult caregivers (Waters & Beauchaine 
2003; Quinn & Mageo 2013). 
Yet as an index of expectations regarding caregiving experience, the 
validity of the Strange Situation has stood primarily on the basis of strong 
associations between individual differences in behaviour in the Strange Situation 
on the one hand, and observational studies of infants and caregivers at home on 
the other. Three classifications of infant behaviour were introduced by 
Ainsworth. Some infants, termed ‘secure’ (B), use their caregiver as a safe base 
from which to venture off in play. They show distress and seek proximity with 
their caregiver on reunion, and can be comforted, allowing them to return to 
play. This behaviour suggests the activation of Bowlby’s attachment system by 
the anxiety of separation, and its subsidence once the infant feels confident that 
protection from their attachment figure is available. Ainsworth’s home 
observations, as well as subsequent research, found that the caregivers for such 
children were those most sensitive and responsive to the child’s attachment 
behaviour (e.g. Leerkes 2011). Other infants, termed ‘insecure-avoidant’ (A), 
showed little visible affect on separation or reunion with their caregiver – but 
they were found to have hidden signs of stress, such as a rapid heart-rate (Sroufe 
& Waters 1977). Home observations found that the caregivers of these infants 
tended not to be sensitive and responsive to their attachment behaviour, 
responding warmly primarily when their child was not distressed (e.g. Isabella & 
Belsky 1991). A third pattern was termed ‘insecure-resistant/ ambivalent’ (C), 
and these infants showed distress even before separation and were clingy, 
frustrated and difficult to comfort on the caregiver’s return, seeming to distrust 
the availability of the adult even when he or she is present. In contrast to infants 
classified as ‘secure’ or ‘avoidant’, home observations revealed the mothers of 
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insecure-resistant/ambivalent infants to be relatively unreliable in their 
response to attachment signals.  
Some aspects of Bowlby and Ainsworth’s work have been extended by 
later researchers. For example, whereas Bowlby focused on primates, ethologists 
have documented attachment behaviour in the young and the corresponding 
cargiving behaviour among mammals and many birds and finding relatively little 
interspecific variation in these behaviours, even among nest- and den-dwelling 
species (e.g. Rifkin & Glickman 2004). Other aspects of Bowlby’s account have 
been amended by later research, however. For instance, researchers found that 
infants developed attachments to multiple caregivers early in life, though the 
more familiar caregiver may still be preferentially discriminated by an infant 
when alarmed until around the age of two (Umemura et al. 2013). An important 
amendment to classical attachment theory has been the introduction of a fourth, 
‘disorganised/disoriented’ (D), classification by Main and Solomon (1986, 1990). 
This classification is used when a contradiction or disturbance in the sequencing 
of the infant’s behaviour suggests that the demands of the attachment system to 
approach the caregiver are being disrupted by a countervailing, centrifugal affect 
(e.g. fear, confusion). Infant behaviours coded as disorganised/disoriented 
include contradictory behaviours or affects occurring simultaneously or 
sequentially; stereotypic, asymmetric, misdirected or jerky movements; and 
stilling or freezing. The three Ainsworth infant attachment patterns, as well as 
the disorganised/disoriented classification, have been found to have associations 
with measures assessing mental health in later life (Sroufe et al. 2009). For 
example, Carlson (1998) reported that a classification of 
disorganised/disoriented attachment in infancy had a strong association with 
indices of dissociation in adolescence. 
Such findings have contributed to the invocation of attachment research in 
general, and disorganised/disoriented attachment in particular in recent years, 
within the psy-disciplines and public discourse on childhood. In response, 
attachment theory and assessments have been situated by sociologists and 
anthropologists of the family as part of the discursive ‘software’ which operates 
the ‘hardware’ of the state’s biopolitical surveillance and disciplining of 
childrearing (e.g. LeVine 2014). From Oakley (1971) to Koffman (2014), feminist 
scholars have also described attachment as a theory and research programme 
animated by a conservative wish to responsibilise women and to police their 
childrearing, depicted as a matter of the future of the nation. For instance, 
Contratto (2002: 29, 34) implicates attachment theory as ‘profoundly 
conservative’, and bent on producing ‘familiar mother-blaming scenarios’. 
Though a small number of commentators, discussing attachment theory, 
emphasise its sociological significance but do not allocate a specific political 
valence (e.g. Redman 2008), we have not found sociologists or feminists who 
have argued against its characterisation as conservative; this seems to be the 
consensus. Such a characterisation stands in contrast to psychoanalysis, one of 
the parent disciplines of attachment theory, which has received both criticism 
and appropriation in the humanities and social sciences. Yet, as Fonagy and 
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Target (2007) have argued, there may be points made by attachment theory 
which can enrich not only psychoanalysis but also the disciplines which have 
drawn upon the latter. In particular, they suggest, empirical attachment research 
may be able to contribute a distinctive and potentially valuable dimension to 
concerns in a variety of areas concerned with human becoming and relationality 
(see also Fonagy 1999; Fonagy et al. 2014). 
 
Lines of flight 
 
In setting out to specify further claims regarding the politics of attachment 
theory, it is important to note that leading contemporary attachment theorists 
have themselves identified fundamental problems in the way their ideas have 
been taken up. Much research on attachment, and a great deal of its use in the 
psy-disciplines, has been premised on the assumption that the four attachment 
categories – A, B, C or D – form an exhaustive taxonomy, and that placement in 
the Main and Solomon ‘disorganised/disoriented’ (D) classification necessarily 
indicates child maltreatment or other forms of dangerously inadequate 
caregiving. One of the two researchers who introduced the D classification, Mary 
Main, describes this as a ‘widespread and dangerous’ mischaracterisation (Main 
et al. 2011: 441). The other, one of the authors of this article, urges that 
disorganisation be understood as a dimension which is orthogonal to the A, B and 
C patterns, reflecting dysregulation in the child-parent relationship. To take 
attachment behaviour as expressing pre-standing taxonomic categories is to 
mistake a representation of reality for the reality of the representation. It is a 
perspective which both depends upon and occludes the dynamic and patterned 
interplay of biological, social and political forces which generate the regularities 
which the classifications work to pick out. That different patterns of attachment 
occur in the Strange Situation which are associated with different caregiving 
experiences shows that, where operational, the attachment system does not 
operate in a unilateral way; attachment only can operate as a determinate system 
on the basis of and through the relational ramifications of its mesh with a 
caregiving system (Solomon & George 2000, 2011). Attachment theory is a 
psychology of the interplay of dynamic forces – even though in practice the field 
has largely spotlighted attachment classifications. Researchers are aware of this 
discrepancy in a general sense, and some have claimed that the field would 
benefit from sharper attention of the processes which operate below the level of 
the classifications, and out of which they are formed. Indeed, a special issue of the 
journal Developmental Psychology was dedicated to affirming that the object of 
attachment research is not the classifications but the relational phenomena the 
classifications have been used to describe (see Fraley & Spieker 2003). 
Deleuze and Guattari offer an ontology devised for conceptualising the 
generative process which classificatory systems both hide and partially capture. 
Drawing inspiration from the philosopher and biologist Gilbert Simondon, 
Deleuze argues that ‘beneath the actual qualities and extensities, species and 
parts, there are spatio-temporal dynamisms. There are the actualising, 
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differenciating agencies. They must be surveyed in every domain, even though 
they are ordinarily hidden by the constituted qualities and extensities’ (Deleuze 
[1968] 2001: 226). To survey and theorise these dynamisms offers a means to 
further develop the political interrogation of the scene of attachment. It can be 
pursued by analysing attachment theory’s ‘appeal to biology’ not only in terms of 
the classifications and prescriptions it makes for human subjects, but in terms of 
the coupling of biological, social and political assemblages which operate below 
and beyond the level of the human subject and which compose it. Deleuze 
recommends ethological analysis as aligned with this ontology, since it begins 
with the variety and coupling of semiotic and non-semiotic forces which 
articulate living forms from within, rather than expressing forms as pre-given 
essences or structures.  
In the Machinic Unconscious ([1979] 2011), Guattari praises the ethological 
reflections of Tinbergen, Hinde and Eibl-Eibesfeld for offering an account able to 
address specific properties and capabilities of semiotic and non-semiotic 
processes whilst also attentive to the variety of configurations that can be 
enacted. He gives the example, from ethological observations by Immelmann of 
finches, that ‘a diamond female that “normally” does not have a territorial song 
acquires one as soon as hormones of the male sex are administered to her. She 
then reproduces the song of the species with which she has been “impregnated” 
at the time of the “sensitive period” of the first 35 days of her life’ (Guattari 
[1979] 2011: 141). This observational research by Immelmann – which, it might 
be noted, occurred in a period of collaboration and discussion with Mary Main 
and later appeared in a jointly edited book (Immelmann et al. 1981) – is used by 
Guattari to illustrate that just because the bird’s song can be cut loose from the 
contexts in which we might expect it by circumstances, this ‘by no means implies 
that it has distanced itself from the most “deterministic” components, like those 
of apprenticeships through imprint or endocrinal transformations’ (Guattari 
[1979] 2011: 141). Whilst praising such ethological work, however, Guattari 
cautions against the tendency, which he identifies especially in Tinbergen, to 
hypostatise the systems that organise sequences of behaviour such that they 
appear as unitary and unconstituted processes. The danger is that this ‘winds up 
reconstituting linear causalities’ and contributing to ‘taxonomism’ ([1979] 2011: 
115, 146).   
Applied to human childhood, Guattari suggests that an ethological 
perspective recognises that ‘the child, as an individuated organic totality, only 
constitutes one intersection among the multiple material, biological, socio-
economic and semiotic components which traverse it’ ([1979] 2011: 160). 
Offering an example which is a good comparison for the coupling of different 
components in attachment, Guattari gives the case of puberty: 
 
In the life of an adolescent the intrusion of the biological components 
of puberty is inseparable from the micro-social context within which 
they appear; they release a series of machinic indexes which have been 
shown, in addition, to liberate a new abstract machine that will be 
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manifested in the most diverse registers: redirection of perceptive 
codes, folding of the self and/or poetic, cosmic, social exteriorisation, 
etc. But this release mechanism in reality has nothing unilateral about 
it because other “external” semiotic components could accelerate, 
inhibit or reorient the effects of the biological and semiotic 
components of puberty ([1979] 2011: 160).  
 
Like the emergence of the biological components of puberty into the subjectivity 
of the child, the disposition for an infant to seek protection from their caregiver 
or caregivers when alarmed is not a unilateral mechanism but an assemblage 
which is realised differently across micro-social contexts, and which in turn 
shapes varied micro-social contexts in the way it is accelerated, inhibited or 
reoriented. The individual is, in this perspective, not prior to their environment 
but codetermined with it, constituted within and through the patterned 
interaction of affects and movements and changes of bodies in relationships. The 
implication in terms of how we should understand the ‘attachment system’ is 
that the reality of such a system, like the classifications through which its 
variations are described, does not pre-exist the contexts, processes and 
interactions through which it occurs. As a disposition occurring at the ‘molecular’ 
level of the neurological system rather than at the ‘molar’ level of the child, the 
attachment system is thus genuinely underdetermined.  
Attachment theory not only can be viewed in ethological perspective but, 
more than this, in fact emerged in dialogue with the work of ethologists. For 
instance, both Tinbergen and Hinde were friends of Bowlby. Considering 
attachment as an ethological rather than anthropocentric concept, Bowlby (1969: 
61) and Main (1979: 641) claim that each child must preserve a line of potential 
movement to the caregiver from their explorations into the world; whereas other 
mammals might have burrows or other associated spatial milieu to which they 
return, primates have determinate figures, living milieu, to whom they always 
wish to know their line of flight. Deleuze and Guattari agree but immediately 
consider the possibility that the line of flight does not result in comfort and 
protection: ‘A line of flight must be preserved to enable the animal to regain its 
associated milieu when danger appears. A second kind of line of flight arises 
when the associated milieu is rocked by blows from the exterior, forcing the 
animal to abandon it and strike up an association with new portions of 
exteriority, this time leaning on its interior milieus like fragile crutches’ (Deleuze 
& Guattari [1980] 1987: 61). All children faced with separation and reunion in 
the Strange Situation are confronted with what Deleuze and Guattari call the 
possibility of ‘becoming-orphan’, a monadic state cut loose from sustaining ties. It 
is debatable whether this ultimate possibility is part the phenomenological 
experience of an infant who has experienced responsive caregiving; work 
integrating attachment theory with psychoanalysis has tentatively suggested that 
infants are predisposed by human evolutionary history to a universal phantasy 
about the loss of the love-object who is needed for survival (Fonagy 2001; Eagle 
2013; Slade 2013). Thinking with Deleuze and Guattari, it can be suggested that 
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the line of flight to the caregiver under situations of alarm indicates a virtual 
possibility for each infant in the spectre of utter abandonment, which only 
becomes relative in the actual organisation of their particular caregiving 
environment: ‘absolute deterritorialisation becomes relative only after 
stratification occurs on that plane or body: it is the strata that are always residue, 
not the opposite’ ([1980] 1987: 63).  
 
Security, negation, dialectic 
 
Considered with Deleuze and Guattari, the Ainsworth ‘organised’ ABC attachment 
patterns appear as strata, determinate but epiphenomenal, produced by the 
possibilities for a line of flight which ends in reterritorialisation with the 
caregiver – some manner of return to their safe harbour, rather than exposure to 
threats reaching potentially all the way to abandonment, injury, or death. First 
we can consider the constellation of forces which comprise what gets observed 
and classified as ‘secure attachment’ (B), and scrutinise the territorialisation and 
deterritorialisation enacted within this pattern. When enacting a line of flight, 
‘the child is constructed within a double series’: a set of perceptual relations with 
the caregiver in the present, and a ‘virtual’ set of experiences, expectations and 
fantasies from the past (Deleuze [1968] 2001: 124). If these series converge such 
that the infant’s line of flight can overcome or integrate possible obstructions, 
then the action the infant takes is fully centripetal, directly sending the child to 
her caregiver when the spectre of absolute deterritorialisation threatens. ‘Secure 
attachment’ appears where this spectre activates a line of flight back to their 
living milieu. Deleuze and Guattari ([1980] 1987: 61) theorise that where there is 
reterritorialisation there will also be a complementary deterritorialisation in a 
different arena, and vice versa. In line with this conceptualisation, confidence in 
the possibility of safe harbour allows the infant a sense of ‘security’, which holds 
at bay the spectre of absolute deterritorialisation. Such confidence permits the 
infant to enact a deterritorialisation themselves, in the form of excited, expansive 
and combinatory play. 
It can be noted that despite highlighting the radical potential of affirmation 
and becoming embodied in centrifugal play, Deleuze and Guattari ([1980] 1987: 
200) predict for each child that, in the passage into adulthood, both the capacities 
for exploration and attachment will be mutilated, reconfigured and plugged into 
the demands of capitalist economics, even if the latter ‘retains some of their 
debris in well-defined enclosures’. This important critique directly implicates 
attachment theory and the construct of attachment in so far as they have been 
used to affirm the affective value of the family at the expense of that of its 
associated milieu, since for Deleuze and Guattari precisely the family is pivotal to 
the colonisation of desire for capitalist production ([1971] 1984). The critique of 
capitalist territorialisation (via the family), however, should not be 
misunderstood as a critique of territorialisation per se, or a critique of the 
ontologically ‘conservative’ vector it represents and of its value in the more 
general context of desiring-production. The line of flight towards a caregiver is a 
11 
 
vector of retreat from the expansive possibilities of experimentation and as such 
it is itself ‘conservative’. But this conservatism is in turn a vector for the 
possibility of becoming (as) an individual at the molar level of the child, a vector 
of the process of returning-to-oneself-as-an-other. As Deleuze and Guattari 
([1980] 1988: 178) emphasise: 
 
[y]ou have to keep enough of the organism for it to reform each dawn; 
and you have to keep small supplies of significance and 
subjectification, if only to turn them against their own systems when 
the circumstances demand it. 
 
In this sense, the line of flight represented by a return to safe harbour is much 
more than a movement of escape from an actual or virtual threat. It is the line of 
access to a reserve of possibilities in excess of those immanent in the situation of 
play and deterritorialisation, through which the child is virtually, and can 
actually become, more and different than it is (now). The potential vector of 
movement to an available caregiver, in other words, is what makes possible the 
eventual ‘escape’ from the caregiver as a source of determination, constraint, 
stratification. Attachment theorists have addressed this phenomenon with the 
concept of the attachment figure as a ‘safe base from which to explore’ for the 
securely attached infant; Ainsworth and Bell (1970: 51), introducing this concept, 
situated ‘exploration’ and ‘venturing forth’ as ‘equally significant’ to any focus on 
the solidity of safety and protection. However, the latter has come to dominate in 
the way attachment theory has been taken up, at the expense of emphasis on the 
important way that expansive possibilities and play can themselves be fed and 
innervated by the centripetally-oriented attachment system. 
 In contrast to the situation of the securely attached infant who anticipates 
a direct line of flight to the caregiver and so can go off to adventure, where a 
direct return to safe harbour is not possible negation and dialectic are two logics 
which can be recruited – as Hegel’s thought illustrates – to serve as alternate 
strategies for achieving reterritorialisation (Deleuze [1962] 1983: Chapter 5). 
Such a recruitment yields the constellations of behaviour and affect which 
comprise the two ‘insecure’ attachment patterns in the Ainsworth Strange 
Situation. Since Main (1979), attachment theory has often termed these patterns 
‘conditional strategies’, a term from evolutionary biology used to refer to the 
availability of stable alternate routes to a particular outcome, such as 
reproduction. Where a contradiction occurs between perception (suggesting the 
caregiver’s physical availability in the room on reunion) and memory (suggesting 
rebuff or unpredictability from the caregiver when the infant is distressed), then 
this implies that a direct and stable return to safe harbour is not possible. In such 
instances the living milieu to which the infant is disposed to return is rocked by 
rebuff or unpredictability: this requires some leaning on interior milieus, but on 
the way to a conditional but stable line of flight (Crittenden & Ainsworth 1989). 
The result of the play of forces here is a predictable pattern of attachment 
behaviour, elicited in the Strange Situation.  
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Where memory suggests that a direct approach will result in rejection by 
the caregiver and as such be counterproductive in keeping the caregiver 
available, an insecure-avoidant attachment strategy (A) will shunt the desire for 
centripetal movement to the caregiver into the interior milieu – as the force of an 
imperative to negate their wish to regain their living milieu. The infant turns his 
or her attention to toys or other aspects of the environment as a means of self-
distraction, rather than as a site for adventure. Conversely, our perspective 
suggests that, generating the insecure-resistant/ambivalent (C) attachment 
strategy, the infant who experiences their living milieu as unpredictable can 
dialectically utilise the very intensity and unpredictability of their felt distress 
and frustration to pre-empt, take charge and give a measure of predictability to 
the interaction – by throwing a tantrum.  
 
Conflicting lines of flight 
 
All three ‘organised’ Ainsworth patterns respond to the threat of 
deterritorialisation with direct or conditional strategies to achieve the 
centripetal imperative of the attachment system. No less than attachment 
theorists, Deleuze and Guattari ([1980] 1987: 297) describe the patterns formed 
in the interaction between assemblages as occurring upon ‘the plane of 
organisation’, which ‘is constantly working away at the plane of consistency, 
always trying to plug the lines of flight, stop or interrupt the movements of 
deterritorialisation, weigh them down, restratify them, reconstitute forms and 
subjects’. Yet as we have seen, Deleuze and Guattari raise the possibility that a 
second kind of line of flight will arise when the milieu is rocked by blows from 
the exterior which force the animal to abandon it, ‘leaning on its interior milieus 
like fragile crutches’. Conflict or problems in the infant’s attachment relationship 
cannot result in a total abandonment of the attachment figure, since the infant 
cannot survive on their own. Instead, the result of such difficulties is a 
disjuncture between a centripetal line of flight to the caregiver, and a 
countervailing, centrifugal line of flight from the caregiver. Both Deleuze and 
Guattari, and Main and Solomon in their thinking about attachment 
disorganisation, conceptualise this disjuncture through ethological work on 
‘conflict behaviour’. Hinde (1966) had suggested that when animals experience a 
conflict between incompatible behavioural dispositions, usually the context 
makes one of these tendencies more salient, and the other waits in abeyance. 
However, when equilibrium between two behavioural dispositions occurs, Hinde 
observed what he called ‘conflict behaviour’ – noting contradictory behaviours or 
affects occurring simultaneously or sequentially; stereotypic, asymmetric, 
misdirected or jerky movements; and stilling or freezing. Some of these 
behaviours, he suggested, might be explained by the fact that behaviours and 
displays of affects could be disinhibited precisely by the contradiction and 
mutual inhibition of other demands. For instance, when facing a conflict between 
a tendency to fight an opponent and a tendency to flee in fear, another behaviour 
system could be activated, such as feeding or drinking.  
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Discussing ethological observations of ‘conflict behaviour’ (later also called 
‘crossroads behaviour’ in Deleuze & Guattari [1980] 1987: 368), Guattari ([1979] 
2011: 116) notes that ‘during the nuptial parades of birds, abrupt reversals of 
situation frequently emerge: the courting phase will suddenly be replaced by an 
aggressive attitude, then simulations of bathing, etc., the various behaviour 
sequences seeming to be entirely demolished into pieces.’ He draws the same 
conclusion that Main and Solomon will a few years later, and which echoes 
earlier psychoanalytic thinking about tics and stuttering (e.g. Ferenczi 1921): 
that conflict behaviour can be observed in humans experiencing a blockage in 
action caused by incompatible dispositional imperatives. Of particular 
importance for such blockages is the role of conflict between those dispositions 
to act evoked by perceptual relations in the present and those evoked by 
experiences, expectations and fantasies from the past: ‘this same mode of 
semiotisation is found in mankind in “blockages”, for example, when a person 
who was accidentally interrupted during the recitation of a text is forced to “start 
over from the beginning”. Behaviour stereotypies are found everywhere in 
human pragmatic fields, sometimes as ordinary events, other times reflecting 
chronic impairment as stuttering and phobic or obsessive reiterations will 
testify’ ([1979] 2011: 117). Guattari proposes that the form taken by conflict 
behaviour will be determined by a constellation of genetic and environmental 
factors, and also include ‘improvisation’, and ‘conjunctional tactics’ which 
attempt to mediate the conflict, as well as express it ([1979] 2011: 134).  
Main and Solomon offer the concept of attachment disorganisation as an 
application of Hinde’s ethological reflections to human infant behaviour. The 
concept was by no means intended to be used, as it has at times by the psy-
disciplines, as an ‘abuse category’ of infant behaviour comprised of 
‘disorganised/disoriented’ displays. Disorganised/disoriented attachment, as 
such, must not be regarded as the fourth classification in a neat taxonomy. Such 
an attempt to resolve reality into representation offers epistemological and 
moral certainties, but they are quite false. In fact, specifically, Main et al. (1985: 
99) state that ‘our discovery of the D category of infant Strange Situation 
behaviour rested on an unwillingness to adopt the “essentialist” or “realist” 
position regarding the classification of human relationships. It was based on the 
presumption that both individuals and relationships are unique and that they 
have a higher “reality” than any classification can fully encompass’.  
It is notable that Deleuze ([1966] 1988: 69) defends use of the term 
‘disorganised’ – not as a synonym for ‘disorder’ – but in a precise sense: a 
disjuncture in the articulation between a human’s perception and their motor-
schema of behavioural dispositions formed by the past, such that affects occur 
which are incompatible within a behavioural sequence. This stops the smooth flow 
of expected behaviour and instead, according to Deleuze and Guattari ([1980] 
1987: 179-181) results in confusion, symptoms such as tics or hypochondria, or 
surprising and potentially ineffective mixes of tendencies towards action. 
Similarly, the concept of attachment disorganisation was defined by Main and 
Solomon (1990: 133) precisely as ‘an observed contradiction in movement 
14 
 
pattern, corresponding to an inferred contradiction in intention or plan’. One 
such contradiction can occur, as Main and Hesse propose, when the caregiver is 
themselves a source of alarm: incompatible lines of flight might arise, both 
towards and away from the caregiver. Yet, contrary to common misconception, 
they urge recognition that such contradiction need not be caused by abuse 
(Hesse & Main 2006). For instance, the presence of multiple social and economic 
risks experienced by a caregiver can predict high rates of disorganised 
classifications for their infant, even where there is no known maltreatment (Cyr 
et al., 2010).  
Such findings direct attention to the importance of the social and political 
context of caregiving: they suggest that the isolation of caregivers from sufficient 
health, social and political resources can obstruct the capacity of the caregiving 
system to respond in a sensitive and coherent way with protection and succour 
to the immature young. Hrdy (2007) has convincingly demonstrated that, though 
the infant’s attachment system directs them to seek their familiar caregiver when 
they need support, human caregivers require support from other helpers to 
maintain a child through a protracted and costly maturation process. She surveys 
the work of anthropologists, epidemiologists and historians who have 
documented that at a population level increasing the resources available to 
caregivers from kin and community supports the nurturance they can offer to 
dependents, and that decreasing such resources directly increases the likelihood 
that a caregiver will neglect their child. Across these diverse fields of study, 
researchers have found that the average quality of care to the young fluctuates 
widely with the resources available to the caregiver. From this we draw the 
conclusion that if the infant’s constructive grasping of centrifugal possibilities is 
contingent on the availability of a centripetal line of flight back to the a safe 
harbour, the caregiver’s capacity to offer such a safe harbour, and the quality of 
care they are able to provide, is similarly contingent on the availability of a line of 
flight that points away from the child—caregiver dyad. This line of flight connects 
the caregiver to a reserve of possibilities in excess of those immanent to their 
caregiving role and as such is centripetal relative to their individuality, allowing 
them to return-to-oneself-as-an-other or to become (as) a caregiver. To give just 
one illustrative piece of attachment research which runs counter to stereotypes 
of the field, a large Australian study found that mothers who valued their career 
and work identity, regardless of whether or not they returned to work during the 
first 12 months postpartum, were more likely to have one-year-olds classified as 
securely attached (Harrison & Ungerer 2012). 
 
Concluding reflections 
 
Beneath the infant attachment classifications, and generating the regularities 
upon which they are based, occur the interplay of centripetal and centrifugal 
forces which open and close the flow of behavioural dispositions. Viewed as such, 
the properties of the attachment system, working particularly under conditions 
of alarm (but all the time to some degree) to close down perceived threat 
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through centripetal reterritorialisation, mean that this system itself can be 
regarded as supporting its conservative deployment. Indeed, despite his 
advocacy of its demands, Bowlby fully acknowledged that ‘attachment is fiercely 
possessive, selfish, utterly intolerant of frustration’ (Robertson & Bowlby 1950: 
138) and that, since women conventionally in our society have responsibility for 
children, capitulation to the demands of the attachment system for immediate 
satisfaction would ‘enslave mothers’ (Bowlby 1958a: 367). The centripetal 
demands of the attachment system have been championed by conservative policy 
discourse and also in the psy-disciplines as expressing the needs of the child (see 
Duschinsky et al. 2015). Yet the distinction between the demands of the 
attachment system and the needs of the child is one which even infants 
themselves are making, when they enact conditional strategies (avoidance and 
ambivalence/resistance) which modulate the demands of the attachment system. 
Both the allegation that attachment is a fully contingent social construction or a 
natural process immune from opposition can be countered by attachment as a 
phenomenon which exemplifies the pore general point that ‘there is, in the living, 
an individuation by the individual and not only a functioning that would be the 
result of an individuation completed once and for all, as if it had been 
manufactured; the living resolves problems, not only by adapting itself, that is to 
say by modifying its relation to the environment (which a machine can do), but 
by modifying itself’ (Simondon [1989] 2009: 7).  
Where the implication of attachment and of attachment research is reduced 
to the infant’s demand for proximity with their familiar caregiver, then this 
reification dovetails well with gender and political conservatism. In a society in 
which women have primary caregiving responsibilities, the attachment 
behaviour of infants will show a demand the availability of mothers – and this 
will appear as support for conservative gender ideologies. Furthermore, the way 
the attachment system disposes the infant to seek a discriminated, familiar 
attachment figure as the solution for their distress, aligns with interventions 
which address the behaviour and personality of the parent with primary 
childcare responsibilities – often the mother. This disposition is dramatised by 
the Strange Situation Procedure, and as such given prominence and visibility. At 
a macro-level, this aligns with and can be used as rhetorical ammunition for 
conservative economic ideologies, which treat the emergence of the self-
sufficient individual as a process which occurs naturally in families and does not 
require health, social or political resourcing. The attachment system is well 
suited for being deterritorialised, reified, and  incorporated into the rhetorical 
and affective needs of contemporary capitalism, as we have documented 
elsewhere using the case of attachment rhetoric within austerity politics in the 
UK since 2010 (Duschinsky et al. 2015).  
 Yet when the distinction between the demands of the attachment system 
and the child’s longer-term needs and potentialities within a caregiver-child dyad 
are recognised, we do not need to either capitulate to or resent the early 
imperative of the attachment system. The line of flight towards a caregiver in the 
face of alarm is indeed a retreat from the expansive possibilities of 
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experimentation, but it can also serve as a vector of the process of returning-to-
oneself-as-an-other, as the security offered by knowledge of a safe harbour 
allows this harbour to be left behind. Such a perspective situates attachment 
theory and research, not as merely or necessarily conservative, but as a rich 
repository of observations and reflections for considering the ways that 
centripetal affects can be resisted and transformed, or used to reassure and 
bolster centrifugal movement. Studies of the mesh between the attachment and 
caregiving systems, for example, contradict conservative social discourses. As an 
example, whereas Bowlby (1958b) argued against day-care on the basis that ‘to 
deprive a small child of his mother’s companionship is as bad as depriving him of 
vitamins’, the implications of day-care for young children have been quite 
thoroughly researched and do not support Bowlby’s position. Indeed, 
longitudinal research which followed 1,153 children from infancy to adolescence 
has found that quality day-care for young children whose mothers are highly 
stressed confers a net benefit rather than a risk (NICHD 1997). Anhert et al. 
(2004) found that children’s attachments could change from an insecure to a 
secure classification if the acclimatisation process was handled sensitively. 
Furthermore, only young children who are in day-care for more than 45 hours a 
week for at least three months have been found to show more behaviour 
assessed by adults as problematic – and a quarter of them do (see Vandell 2004 
for a review). It appears that unless the extent of the separation is sufficient to 
undermine the capacity of the child to retain a perception of the availability of 
the caregiver, attachment research contradicts Bowlby’s claims that maternal 
care is better or required by ‘Nature’. 
Indeed, we disagree with Bowlby in those statements where he claims that 
society should follow the dictates of ‘Nature’ in order to support the development 
of children’s psychological health. In general, we do not think that the way 
biological possibilities articulate with social and political assemblages produces 
any unitary voice or injunction: the realities are far more complex and our 
thinking must encompass the full range of forces within which caregiver-child 
relationships are formed and embedded.  We consider that the imperatives of the 
infant’s attachment system, which prioritise immediate protection as embodied 
in proximity to the living milieu of the attachment figure, does not always align 
with the longer-term interests of the child-mother dyad. Like Hrdy, those 
addressing these issues need to separate out the needs of a caregiver from the 
imperatives of the attachment system of the young child; whereas the latter 
demands reunion, the former needs solidarity between adults and sharing of 
health, social and political resources. The politics of the attachment system might 
tend to support a conservative agenda, but a perspective which considers the 
couplings and connections of the attachment system provides resources for a 
countervailing, progressive politics and form of social analysis.  
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